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Murphy: What is Tank Country?

What is Tank Country?
William Murphy
here are certain principles that evolved
during the past war that should be applicable
to future operations, and one of these principles,
it is suggested, is the answer to the question of
what is and what is not tank country. Many
serving and former members of the Royal
Canadian Armoured Corps will recollect how
eagerly they perused reports from the western
desert during the years they sat in England
awaiting their turn. They realized that in all
probability when they saw action it would be with
a better vehicle and in totally different country.
But the only reports available, so far as tanks
were concerned dealt with their use in the desert.
Such country permitted commanders to exploit
the mobility of this particular weapon to the full,
and it played a great, if not predominant, part in
every victory won, no matter by which side. In
very rocky country, or where the going was too
soft, tanks could not operate, but there was
always plenty of other portions of the front where
the going was good. Thus the question of what
was, or what was not, tank country did not receive
the early consideration that it otherwise might
have.

T

When Canadian tanks landed in Sicily it was
soon realized that this mountainous country
called for far different tactics, so far as tanks
were concerned, than did a wide open country
such as the desert. In almost every case the
infantry were the predominant arm and the tank's
job was to support them to the best of its ability.
Both arms had much to learn in actual warfare
in difficult country, and it was hardly surprising
that infantry thought tanks should do more than
they were prepared to do, and the tanks thought
infantry were hopelessly ignorant of the tank's
capabilities. To begin with, neither really
appreciated what a tank could or could not do
to give the infantry a helping hand in the varied
This article is adapted from a piece that
originally appeared in the Canadian Army
Journal, Vol.5, No.1, Aprill951.

country that was fought over. Nor did either
realize the tremendous help that infantry could
afford tanks in close going. Italy, with its
mountains, valleys, olive groves, vineyards,
crops, walled cemeteries, and other detestable
features (that is, from a tank point of view) further
complicated relations between the two arms.
After all, the infantry wore cloth jackets, and the
tankmen had several inches of steel to protect,
them, so why should not the tanks fight where
the infantry had to go? But at first the tank men
were reluctant. Their steel was not much good
against the well-concealed antitank gun or the
boldly handled infantry anti-tank weapon. In
close country they could not see them and
therefore could not protect themselves. The
gunner's telescope was masked by olive groves
and vines, and he was unable to give effective
support to the infantry in any event. So the interservice battle raged, and at times there was
considerable feeling between the two arms. But
experience was bearing fruit. The tank men, who
had been taught that tank country was that
country which afforded the best going, and
contained successive features permitting good
fields of fire from hulldown positions, and
support, tank by tank or troop by troop, began
to learn that it was just such country that was
the best protected by anti-tank weapons.
Few forces can have sufficient tank stoppers
to be strong in them at all points. The anti-tank
weapons were usually concentrated to cover the
best tank approaches. The tank men started to
experiment. They found they could climb slopes
they thought were impossible. It was just a matter
of skillful driving. They found that much rocky
ground could be traversed with care and
attention. They found that even terraced hills
could be topped by driving the terraces until a
low point was found and then charging a path to
the next terrace, and so on. Sunken roads and
other obstacles could be overcome by the use of
explosives, so they took along tank sappers,
trained in demolition and mine clearance, and
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Canadian irifantry advancing through the hills qf
Italy with annoured support.

carried them in cut-down Honeys moving with
squadrons. They used the tank dozer well
forward to help clear the way where necessary.
Time and again they found these tactics won
them that pearl beyond price - surprise - and
soon they were looking not for good going, but
the going where only skill and experience could
get them through.
The policy was laid down, at least in the
writer's formation, that every request of the
infantry must be met if it was humanly possible
to get the tanks over the ground. The response
of the infantry was immediate. As soon as they
found the tanks were ready to take on almost
anything, their confidence in the tank men firmed,
and the two started to work together in a most
satisfactory manner. In not one single instance
did the writer find that infantry, once assured of
the tank mens' real desire to help, took unfair
advantage of that cooperation. It was soon
realized by all concerned that each arm had its
own particular tactics. Iftanks stopped to bring
fire to bear on a position, the infantry quickly
learned that they were not quitters, but that this
was the very moment for them to press on under
cover of that fire. They soon got to know that
regardless of how close the country, the tanks
were right behind them, depending on them to
winkle the concealed antitank weapons, and
ready to forge ahead when more open country
was reached. The infantry normally preferred
country which gave them the maximum in
covered lines of approach, although often this was
not the direction of attack the tank men would

have chosen. But when the tanks had learned
that they could depend on the infantry, and so
long as they could get their vehicles forward. they
cheerfully accepted the infantry's choice of
ground. Infantry and tank cooperation reached
a high peak of efficiency, and the results were
very gratifying- at least to our side. Even in the
Apennines, where the tanks were wholly roadbound, they were found more than useful. They
formed a firm base from which the infantry could
fan out into the hills. They brought accurate direct
and indirect fire to bear when it was most needed.
And it gave the infantry a comfortable feeling to
have them around. Infantry like to have tanks
near them. Possibly the tank is blind in close
country and therefore helpless, or road-bound,
or blacked out on a dark night, or otherwise not
much of an asset. Nevertheless. the infantry like
to have them around. There is a psychological
factor here which is most important and should
never be overlooked. The old practice of "rear
rally" for reorganization, petrol, rations, etc., was
discontinued in Italy by the Writer's formation.
The tanks stayed with the infantry and supplies
were taken forward to them. Even if they couldn't
see to fire they could lay their guns on fixed lines,
and the starting up of tank engines, and the sound
of their guns at night, were found to have a most
satisfactory effect both on our own and the enemy
troops. The close and intimate training of tanks
and infantry is essential if the best results are to
be obtained. Where the tanks are to fight with
well-trained infantry who know and trust them,
then we have no difficulty in answering the
question which forms the title of this article.
Under such circumstances there is only one type
of country that is non-tank country, namely, that
terrain over which it is physically impossible to
move the tanks even with the use of explosives,
tank dozers or any other artificial aids that are
available or can be improvised.
Brigadier William Murphy, CBE, DSO,
commanded the lst Canadian Armoured
Brigade in Italy and Northwest Europe until
the cessation of hostilities. He remained
involved with the Armoured Corps following
the end of the war.

70

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss4/9

2

